Demarcative Philosophy: Doing Philosophy Beyond the Boundaries of Meaning

Abstract

This article examines the concept of demarcation in Philosophy of Science, aiming to establish the boundary between meaningful and meaningless propositions or theories. Through a qualitative approach based on literature studies, this research explores the perspectives of three main groups of thinkers on demarcation: the Vienna Circle, Karl Popper, and Thomas Kuhn. The Vienna Circle introduced the verification principle as a tool to determine meaningfulness, rejecting metaphysics as unverifiable empirically. Conversely, Popper criticized the verification approach for its subjectivity and proposed falsification as a more objective method. Meanwhile, Kuhn highlighted the role of paradigms and scientific revolutions, rejecting both verification and falsification principles. This article discusses the importance of demarcation approaches in distinguishing between philosophical and non-philosophical studies and assessing the usefulness of theories or propositions. Although demarcation plays a crucial role, this article also critiques the potential rigidity and exclusivity that can arise if not applied wisely, emphasizing the need for a balance between demarcation and openness in philosophical praxis to maintain the relevance and usefulness of intellectual thought.