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Demarcative Philosophy: Doing Philosophy Beyond the Boundaries of Meaning

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Abstract

This article explores the concept of demarcation in the Philosophy of Science, focusing on how to distinguish meaningful from meaningless propositions. It examines the views of three key thinkers: the Vienna Circle, Karl Popper, and Thomas Kuhn. The Vienna Circle introduced the verification principle, which assesses the meaning of statements based on empirical verifiability, rejecting metaphysical claims as meaningless. In contrast, Popper criticized this approach for its subjectivity, advocating for falsification as a more objective criterion, where a theory is scientific if it can be tested and potentially disproven. Kuhn shifted the discussion by emphasizing paradigms and scientific revolutions, challenging both verification and falsification. He argued that scientific practice is shaped by historical and sociological contexts. The article highlights the importance of different demarcation approaches in differentiating philosophical from non-philosophical studies and assessing the utility of theories. However, it also warns against the rigidity of demarcation criteria, which can hinder intellectual diversity. Ultimately, demarcation should be seen not just as a scientific tool, but as an evolving philosophical issue that engages with human understanding. Balancing clear boundaries with openness to new ideas is essential for keeping philosophical inquiry relevant and adaptable.

Keywords: Demarcation, Verification, Falsification, Paradigm, Science Revolution, Philosophical Praxis

Introduction

The demarcation or determination of the boundary of meaningfulness of a proposition or theory is a concept that is grappled with in the discourse of Philosophy and Science. In his relatively new research, Maarten Boundry notice that demarcation is closely related to the effort to identify and establish the boundaries of meaningfulness, which then distinguishes between propositions or theories that are meaningful (which can be considered scientific) and those that are not meaningful (which are considered speculative and pseudo) (Boudry, 2022). As an effort to identify and establish the boundaries of meaningfulness, there are undoubtedly strengths and weaknesses of the demarcation concept, and this concept certainly provides benefits in the development of scientific knowledge.

However, contemporary discussions in the philosophy of science are increasingly shifting toward a more pluralistic and practical approach to demarcation. Ilmari Hirvonen and Janne Karisto view that this shift reflects the recognition that scientific inquiry is not static but rather a continually evolving process that adapts to new discoveries, methodologies, and paradigms. Thinkers advocate for a framework that accommodates the complexities of scientific practice, including the historical and sociocultural contexts that influence scientific development (Hirvonen & Karisto, 2022).

This pluralistic perspective acknowledges that no single criterion can adequately capture the nuances of scientific reasoning. Instead, it promotes a combination of various factors—such as empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and the ability to generate testable hypotheses—as essential components of what constitutes meaningful scientific discourse. For Lukáš Bielik, through embracing a more inclusive approach, philosophers of science can better address the diverse and dynamic nature of scientific activities, recognizing that boundaries may shift as knowledge progresses (Bielik, 2012).

Furthermore, this evolving understanding of demarcation has implications for how we engage with emerging fields and interdisciplinary research. Libor Benda argue that the demarcation between science and pseudoscience represents an important problem deserving a serious attention. Thus, a flexible demarcation framework becomes crucial in evaluating the validity and relevance of new theories and methodologies that do not neatly fit into established categories (Benda, 2015).

By referring to several previous studies that have been described earlier. In this paper, I will explore that the demarcation problem remains a vital and complex issue within the philosophy of science. The evolution of scientific inquiry necessitates reevaluating traditional criteria and an openness to a pluralistic approach. By embracing this complexity, philosophers can foster a more comprehensive understanding of what it means for a proposition to be scientifically meaningful, ultimately enriching the discourse surrounding the nature and practice of science without being trapped to knowledge reduction.

Methodology

The research method employed in this article is qualitative, focusing on uncovering, describing, and explaining social phenomena through the analysis of ideas and meanings. Qualitative research aims to build a deep understanding relevant to social routines and contexts (Kallestrup, 2024). In this study, the literature review technique plays a central role in achieving the qualitative research objectives. The literature gathered is directly related to the philosophical issues raised in this paper and aligns with the theoretical constructs underpinning the research, while also acknowledging the study's limitations.

This paper explores these philosophical concepts in depth, rather than merely scratching the surface. It also considers the logical possibilities for improving the situations encountered in everyday life. By emphasizing a dominant literature review, the study focuses primarily on literary sources, intentionally excluding field studies. Consequently, the phenomena observed in the field are derived from secondary data rather than direct empirical observation. The primary data for this paper come from books and works that engage with the discourse of demarcation in Philosophy and Science, which is the main focus of the research. Secondary data are sourced from related materials, such as journal articles and other scholarly works connected to the paper's title.

However, it is essential to recognize that engaging in qualitative research, particularly within the realm of philosophy, requires a nuanced understanding of not only the content of texts but also the interpretive horizons that shape how meaning is constructed. This necessitates a hermeneutic approach—one that views texts not just as static sources of information but as dynamic dialogues that expand the boundaries of knowledge. Furthermore, the interpretive horizons will be used in this research.

To fully appreciate the significance of the texts examined, it is crucial to consider the life forms and conceptual practices that inform and contextualize the words used by authors. This approach encourages a deeper examination of the underlying assumptions, cultural contexts, and philosophical frameworks from which these texts emerge. By doing so, the research can illuminate the broader implications of the demarcation discourse, revealing how these ideas resonate within various social and intellectual contexts. This layered analysis ultimately enriches the understanding of the subject matter and contributes to a more comprehensive engagement with the philosophical themes at hand.

Findings and Discussions

Overview of the Demarcation Problem

Demarcation refers to the effort to establish clear boundaries or criteria between scientific and pseudo-scientific theories or propositions (Pratama, 2023b). The Vienna Circle indirectly initiated this effort through its approach of logical inference in the principle of verification. The Vienna Circle was a group of scholars from the fields of exact and natural sciences based in Vienna, the capital of Austria (Audi & Audi, 2013, pp. 1109–1110). They believed that the task of scientists is to explain the structure or logic of science and then set boundaries to control the direction of its dialectical development. In this context, the principle of verification is placed within the context of meaningfulness. As a result, a statement is considered meaningful when it can be empirically observed and verified.

The principle promoted by the Vienna Circle sparked debate. Direct and primary debates regarding the concept of demarcation based on the principle of verification emerged in the thoughts of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. Referring to both, the discourse on demarcation begins with the word 'problem' (Sinaga, 2022, p. 22) because both—each with their approach—provided critical and evaluative notes on the concept of demarcation based on the Vienna Circle's principle of verification, even though both (Wibowo, 2023a, pp. 185–186) still tended to think demarcatively based on their respective criteria of meaningfulness (Wibowo, 2023b, pp. 208–209). This is evident through the boundary-setting or marking-based thinking patterns that are dominant in the thoughts of Popper and Kuhn.

In determining the boundaries of meaningfulness, each of their reference bases is the critical and evaluative aspect that demarcation refers to the concept explaining the separation between legitimate science, which is responsive to experimentation and observation, and pseudo or false science, which cannot be proven through experimentation and observation (Popper, 2002, pp. 10–11). Of course, this involves a series of criteria to set boundaries against propositions or theories to be established. Instead of viewing verification, falsification, and paradigms as discrete theories, it is more productive to consider them as interconnected moments in the evolution of epistemic understanding. Each perspective marks a distinct phase in the development of scientific thought, illustrating how our approaches to knowledge and meaning have transformed.

Verification highlights the importance of empirical evidence in establishing the validity of scientific claims, while falsification introduces a critical lens that prioritizes the potential for disproof as a hallmark of scientific rigor. Meanwhile, the concept of paradigms emphasizes the social and historical contexts in which scientific inquiry takes

place, suggesting that scientific progress is not merely a linear accumulation of knowledge but rather a series of shifts in perspective that redefine what is considered meaningful. By recognizing these interconnected moments, we can appreciate the dynamic nature of scientific discourse and the way it evolves in response to new challenges and insights, ultimately enriching our understanding of the very foundations of scientific inquiry.

The problem of demarcation becomes a central discourse because it addresses, weighs, and limits the issue of scientific meaning. In the context of the three demarcation thinkers to be shown in the following sections, it becomes clear that the meaningfulness of each proposition or theory is that which is logically established and can be concluded through verification, falsification, and paradigm. If it does not meet the criteria of verification, falsification, and paradigm, then the proposition becomes meaningless, considered metaphysical, or is a pseudo proposition or theory. In the next three sub-sections, the I will present three versions of demarcation from three thinkers who popularized demarcation in the discourse of Philosophy and Science.

The Vienna Circle's Demarcation

The Vienna Circle refers to a group of thinkers influential in the development of logical positivism in the early 20th century. This group was founded by Moritz Schlick in 1924, though its meetings had been taking place since 1922 and continued uninterrupted until 1938. Its members included Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Hans Hahn (1880-1934), Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Hans Reichenbach (1891-1955), and Victor Kraft (1880-1975) (Pratama, 2023a).

The Vienna Circle became renowned in the history of Philosophy and Science for proposing the concept of scientific demarcation. According to the Vienna Circle, demarcation refers to the effort to seek a dividing line between meaningful and meaningless propositions or theories (Sarkar, 2024). Their endeavor originated from their consistency and contributions to the verification principle (Taryadi, 1989, p. 41). This verification principle was part of their attempt to develop clear criteria to determine whether a statement is meaningful or not and how scientists should use it as the foundation for scientific thinking.

In simple terms, the verification principle can be outlined as follows:



From that image, it becomes clear that the Vienna Circle was collectively eager to create unified science. Unified science served as a vision guiding them to avoid errors in distinguishing what is meaningful from what is meaningless. This view was heavily influenced by Auguste Comte's notion of positive knowledge or positivism (science based on logical and definite/mathematical approaches). For the Vienna Circle, positivism had to free itself from subjective preferences to objectively claim the truth solely based on empirical evidence, not subjective preferences (Anetoh, 2024). To achieve this, a meaningful proposition or theory was first proposed and then assessed based on the principle of verification.

According to this principle, the Vienna Circle firmly rejected metaphysical propositions or theories, considering them "meaningless and empty." They argued that metaphysics would weaken the position of experimental and observational science, making it impossible to pursue scientific aspects through the inductive method (Ladyman, 2012, p. 150). Metaphysics is based on beliefs in non-empirical entities and internal relations that cannot be verified; thus, it is rejected. Acceptable reality is the observable external reality and relations that are logical entities (Lubis, 2014, p. 154). Therefore, the principle of verification emphasizes the aspect of logical inference that the meaningfulness of a proposition or theory is determined by its formal and empirical nature.

As a consequence of the view based on the significance of logical inference, the Vienna Circle's version of demarcation also allowed room for a priori reasoning within an analytical framework and a posteriori reasoning within a synthetic framework. This means that within the analytical framework, the position of "exact science" demarcated as "meaningful" does not reveal a factual truth but merely represents that the meaningfulness of the proposition or theory has been verified (Ladyman, 2012, pp. 151–152). This is why the principle of verification in the Vienna Circle's

demarcation is merely a criterion of logical inference of truth that can be empirically proven according to logical procedures.

Demarcation According to Karl Popper

Karl Raimund Popper (commonly known as Karl Popper) was a philosopher and scientist born on July 28, 1902, in Vienna, Austria. His name became renowned in the history of philosophy and science for his critique of the Vienna Circle's view on the demarcation concept based on the verification principle (Parusniková, 2021). Popper's critical argument is actually quite simple: demarcation cannot solely rely on verification but must be open to testing and criticism procedures (Popper, 2002, pp. 12–13). Testing and criticism became the means for Popper to introduce the principle of falsification in his demarcation concept.

Popper criticized the Vienna Circle's version of demarcation because he believed that the principle they developed could lead to authoritarianism in the advancement of knowledge. This is due to its nature of attempting to move away from subjective preference and into the realm of objective determination, which is based on their group (Bernays, 2017). In contrast, Popper proposed a more critical and comprehensive approach to the production or reproduction of meaningful propositions or theories, namely, one based on criticism and testing for error (Harahap, 2023, pp. 6799–6800).

Furthermore, Popper viewed that the demarcation concept promoted by the Vienna Circle tended to reduce the essence of knowledge, which should be dynamic and open. Based on this, Popper became one of the sharpest critics of the Vienna Circle's demarcation principle, with his criterion known as falsification (Harahap, 2023, p. 6801). Popper's demarcation concept operates in the realm of determining the boundaries of the meaningfulness of a proposition or theory outside the context of the verification principle.

Popper's critique and evaluation of the verification principle began with the understanding of removing the "hidden subjectivity" in the Vienna Circle's demarcation concept. The Vienna Circle needed to be made aware that the verification principle tended to be subjective, particularly in the induction method that allows for generalization (Popper, 1963, pp. 33–39). Additionally, the objectification efforts were based on their group. Popper then put forth the principle of falsification, which emphasizes testing propositions or theories based on their potential to be proven false or refuted. Therefore, while the Vienna Circle used verification as the principle to determine the boundaries of the meaningfulness of a proposition or theory with the aim of providing confirmation, Popper used falsification for the opposite purpose.

Simply put, Popper's principle of falsification is as follows:



From this description, it is evident that the falsification theory opens space for the complexity of criticism towards a scientific theory. Popper demonstrates that scientific theories are dynamic. The objective side of the falsification criterion, according to Popper, is seen in its openness to all criticisms of a proposition or theory. This means that Popper's demarcation positions others as evaluators. For Popper, criticism is the only method to approach corroboration. In other words, by emphasizing the importance of criticism, a proposition or theory gradually approaches the truth (Mitra, 2020, pp. 7–8). Therefore, Popper opposes the Vienna Circle's view, which prioritizes logical testing through empirical steps as a means to achieve truth.

A scientific proposition or theory must be falsifiable, determining meaning open and dialectical, including metaphysical statements. By this, Popper argues that the concept of demarcation—as offered by the Vienna Circle—that rejects metaphysics does not truly distinguish between the two (Popper, 1963, p. 35). This argument not only leads Popper to shift subjectivity but also to rethink and even falsify the Vienna Circle's position on the meaningfulness of a proposition or theory, thereby restoring the meaningfulness of metaphysics and eliminating the absolute nature of truth for the development of science. This argument gives rise to the reinterpretation that religious and metaphysical sciences can be categorized as scientific because they can be falsified and undergo development.

However, within the framework, we are also reminded that Popper’s falsification principle is not simply a rejection of verification; rather, it embodies an insistence on the openness of science to contradiction and critique. This shift signifies a move away from the metaphysical closure of knowledge towards a dialectical openness that is integral to the scientific process. Engaging more deeply with the negativity inherent in Popper’s philosophy reveals it as a profound philosophical critique of epistemology itself. In this light, the ability to confront and potentially refute

established theories becomes a vital part of scientific progress, emphasizing that knowledge is provisional and subject to revision. This dialectical framework encourages a collaborative and critical approach to knowledge, where ideas are continuously tested and refined in the face of new evidence or arguments. Thus, Popper's philosophy not only redefines the boundaries of scientific inquiry but also enriches our understanding of how knowledge evolves in response to critique and contradiction, fostering a more dynamic and responsive epistemic landscape.

Thomas Kuhn's Demarcation

Thomas Samuel Kuhn, commonly known as Thomas Kuhn, was a renowned philosopher and historian of science, best known for introducing the concept of "Scientific Revolutions" in the context of seeking the meaningfulness of propositions or theories. Born in 1922 and passing away in 1996, Kuhn is considered one of the foremost thinkers of the 20th century in the history of philosophy and science (Marcum, 2005). His prominent concept emerged from his frequent in-depth case studies on the history and practice of science, particularly in his engagements with the Vienna Circle and Karl Popper (Bird, 2011). These studies subsequently influenced his framework for constructing the concept of scientific revolutions.

Kuhn's concept of scientific revolutions encompasses phases such as normal science, anomalies, crisis, and paradigm revolution. Kuhn argued that science does not merely progress within a fixed paradigm framework; rather, paradigms themselves undergo revolutions, resulting in fundamental shifts that affect the basic assumptions regarding the determination of meaningfulness (Bird, 2011, p. 478). When ordered, Kuhn's phases of scientific revolution are as follows:

Paradigm I → Normal Science → Anomali → Crisis → Revolution → Paradigm II

This phase precisely indicates that a paradigm is periodic. It can dominate Science only in a particular period. This paradigm then develops during normalcy, when scientists work to develop and deepen the existing paradigm. However, when the paradigm fails to address the challenges and problems emerging from the context, conflicts and anomalies arise. These conflicts and anomalies create a crisis. If the crisis reaches a certain level, it can lead to a scientific revolution (Sujud, 2022, pp. 196–197).

Based on this depiction, at its end, a scientific revolution will replace the old paradigm with a new one. Scientific paradigms create profound changes in how scientists view and understand their context (Kuhn, 1996, pp. 35–37). Thus, according to Kuhn, paradigm shifts are revolutionary steps that occur after passing through a series of existing phases. Revolution is a change in worldview; when paradigms change, the world changes with them. It is this framework of thinking that led Kuhn to critique and evaluate the principle of falsification in the demarcation concept advocated by Karl Popper.

In his critique and evaluation, Kuhn still tends to think in terms of demarcation. Thus, he is also known as one of the demarcation thinkers of philosophy and Science. His demarcation concept is known to hinge on his prominent idea of "scientific revolution," suggesting that the dialectics of Science need to preserve and allow its constant and dialectical essence through a series of scientific revolution processes involving paradigms (Sinaga, 2022, p. 22). He emphasizes that propositions or theories should evolve through the principle of a scientific revolution involving paradigms, not just in terms of how much they can be verified, affirmed, falsified, and then corroborated. This emphasis leads him to be concerned with determining the boundaries of meaningful research.

Critically, Kuhn sees that scholarly discourse in his time tended to be dull because research was only developed based on existing and institutionalized methods, such as induction, deduction, and conclusion. It is based on this that the scientific revolution becomes an urgency for him. The starting point of his scientific revolution is the change of paradigm (Kuhn, 1996, pp. 172–173). A paradigm is a criterion used to understand and explain the world. A paradigm shift is a revolutionary step necessary to determine the meaningfulness of research.

Kuhn sees that paradigm shifts play a crucial role in the development of scientific discourse. In this context, propositions or theories must be willing to be replaced because, at some point, their statements become irrelevant, and it is at this stage that a scientific revolution is achieved (Wibowo, 2023b, pp. 199–200). Kuhn touches upon this demarcation aspect, which stems from his critique of falsification and his observation of the dominance of the Vienna Circle in determining the boundaries of meaningfulness.

Kuhn's demarcation aspect highlights paradigms as a method of scientific revolution and rejects verification and falsification as criteria for meaningfulness. Only in certain periods (such as the time of Galileo or Einstein) do

falsification and verification become relevant. However, in later periods, both may become irrelevant. This is because both principles move precisely on the basis of existing theories.

Kuhn's concept of paradigms warrants further philosophical analysis, revealing deeper implications for the structure of knowledge itself. As the author highlights, Kuhn's work is anchored in an understanding of the historical shifts that characterize scientific thought, suggesting that knowledge is not merely a linear progression but rather a series of transformative phases. This model transcends mere sociological observation; it challenges the very foundations upon which scientific knowledge is built. By illustrating how paradigms dictate the norms and practices of scientific inquiry, Kuhn invites us to reconsider how we define and understand knowledge. His framework suggests that what is deemed "scientific" is not solely a matter of empirical validation but is also profoundly influenced by the collective beliefs and practices of the scientific community at any given time. This recognition encourages a more nuanced view of scientific progress, one that acknowledges the role of historical context and the fluidity of epistemic standards, ultimately reshaping our understanding of the development of scientific knowledge.

If observed, then both merely develop specific points, so determining the boundaries of the meaningfulness of a proposition or theory tends to reduce the essence of Science itself (Wibowo, 2023b, p. 201). However, Kuhn focuses on how Science can develop not towards judgment and limitation but towards its development. Thus, his focus implies that Science does not develop cumulatively and evolutionarily but revolutionarily (Verhaak & Imam, 1991, pp. 163–164). In the following section, implications of the three versions of demarcation from the three popularizers will be drawn into philosophical praxis.

Implications of Demarcation in Philosophical Praxis

Currently, the understanding of philosophy has expanded beyond mere dialectics on the love of wisdom. I reflects that this broadened understanding will open opportunities to deepen the meaning of philosophical activity itself, from initially being concerned only with thought to also focusing on its practical relevance (Harsawibawa, 2023b). This means that philosophy not only explores theoretical realms but also practical ones (Harsawibawa, 2023a). From my perspective, such philosophical praxis will then prominently consider its usefulness aspect, thus requiring the delineation of boundaries concerning its meaningfulness. Based on this understanding, philosophical praxis can be defined as the active application of philosophical thought and inquiry in real-world contexts, encompassing various activities aimed at understanding, explaining, and engaging with the complexities of human experience.

The praxis integrates three main dimensions: practical utility, dialectical activity, and methodological clarity. Practical utility emphasizes the relevance of philosophical thought to scientific development. This dimension recognizes that knowledge is not static but shaped by ongoing discourse and the confrontation of differing perspectives. Dialectical activity highlights the essence of philosophy as a process of dialogue and critique, where ideas are tested, challenged, and refined through interaction. This dialectical nature allows for the evolution of thought, fostering a dynamic exchange that contributes to deeper understanding. Methodological clarity pertains to the systematic approaches used in philosophical inquiry, ensuring that the methods employed are transparent and coherent. Methodological clarity helps define the scope and limits of philosophical investigation, providing a framework within which philosophical arguments can be rigorously developed and assessed.

According to the reflection above, the concept of demarcation can become and provide an important evaluative framework for philosophical praxis. However, on the other hand, it can also dampen the constant and dialectical nature of philosophy. The problem of demarcation highlights the difficulty in determining the boundaries between which thoughts belong to the realm of philosophy and which do not. The question arises, "How can we determine the boundary between meaningful and meaningless philosophical thoughts? Wouldn't such determination efforts actually reduce the essence of philosophy as a dialectical activity?"

Indeed, the concept of demarcation holds power for philosophical praxis to underpin evaluative frameworks for every philosophical thought produced, thus emphasizing Harsawibawa and Pratama's reflection that philosophy should not only engage in abstract discourse but remain aware of being situated within contexts and consider its usefulness aspect to be highly valuable. Even Popper himself has reminded us that philosophy should discuss reality and engage with the world, not merely confined to explanations of words. However, his demarcation criteria tend to inhibit the constant and dialectical nature of philosophical praxis, as discourse limitations become situated due to factors of determining the boundaries of scholarship rather than being situated because of the benefits within situational patterns. This can lead to the dominance of pragmatic patterns over paradigmatic ones in philosophical praxis.

In this context, demarcation may actually render philosophical values counter-revolutionary. Kuhn has reminded of this in his evaluation of Popper's thoughts; hence, based on this, according to aim in this research, the philosophical praxis should transcend demarcation boundaries so that philosophy does not get trapped in caricatures of determining boundaries of scholarship that do not lead to revolutionary paradigmatic developments and consequently do not produce diverse philosophical thoughts that are constant, dialectical, while still considering their usefulness. For example, the demarcation criteria for the proposition of a chair is a piece of furniture designed for sitting. However,

a second proposition emerges, explaining that a chair personifies the representation of political party cadres in parliament. In that context, the second proposition is declared meaningless because it does not reflect what has been demarcated regarding a chair, even though the second proposition can be proven. This example aims to illustrate how rigid philosophical praxis can become if solely centered on demarcation.

If philosophical praxis revolves solely around demarcation, it can become rigid and exclusive. Overly strict demarcation can cause philosophy to be interested only in marking which thoughts are philosophical and which are not. Philosophical thinkers may then feel overly constrained by its criteria, thus diminishing critical and dialectical power in their thinking, making philosophy a dry praxis less responsive to the dynamics of scientific revolutions. However, the usefulness of demarcation needs to be acknowledged so that philosophical praxis is not abused and manipulated to justify everything.

Nevertheless, the frame of reference from the Vienna Circle limits the broader meaning but reminds philosophy to think about the specifications of thought and, if relevant, how that thought intends to address certain issues. Thus, in this regard, demarcation remains important to consider because philosophical praxis is conceptually not intended to address all issues. In this context, philosophical praxis becomes a theoretical and practical activity capable of sufficiently articulating within a specific thought situation. Indeed, philosophy is an ongoing study, but that would only be successful if it reached a goal to address specific issues.

The concept of demarcation according to the Vienna Circle, Karl Popper, and Thomas Kuhn, as well as reflections from Harsawibawa and Pratama's versions, as much as possible remind us that philosophical praxis and its discussions need to be bounded or specified so that their meanings are not lost and remain relevant to the needs of the time or specific communities. However, its intellectual process still surpasses existing limitations so that philosophical thinking not only produces and reproduces theories but synthesizes them, maintains their scholarly nature, and positions their usefulness for the development of knowledge.

Based on this, the development of philosophical praxis not only discusses its historical epistemology but also its critical and comprehensive eliminative axiology. To philosophize means not only being ready to think and act but also to be ready to rethink and re-act because, at some point, a proposition or theory becomes meaningless. This diversity will make philosophical praxis highly dynamic, objectively rigid, yet flexible, considering its usefulness.

Philosophical praxis also reconsiders its orientation towards pursuing wisdom. Wisdom is pursued through discussions that are specific, situational, and bring about benefits. This is because philosophical praxis always begins with the personal observations of philosophical thinkers towards an object, involving their perception from specific backgrounds and contexts. Thus, the future of philosophical praxis will be oriented toward the dynamics of the meaning of a proposition or theory. This means that in the future, philosophical praxis will not only focus on theoretical finality but will orient towards its critical and comprehensive aspects to produce or reproduce philosophical thoughts intended for public discourse. This pattern will be illustrated further when demarcation materializes in a particular pattern within philosophical praxis. At last, to effectively illustrate the significance of philosophical praxis in contemporary discourse, it is essential to first explore its implications in detail.

Demarcative Philosophical Sketches

After analyzing its implications, the I will demonstrate the pattern of demarcation philosophy. In emphasizing that philosophy is more than just discourse-loving wisdom, engaging in philosophy will never be detached from the production or reproduction of theories through critical and comprehensive investigation and testing. This step asserts that philosophical praxis is critical, comprehensive, dynamic, and testable. It is also related to the primary function of philosophy in this era, namely conducting methodological studies to clarify scientific concepts in the dialectic of Knowledge.

The concept of demarcating philosophy will assist philosophical thinkers in emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between scientific (philosophical) and non-scientific (non-philosophical) statements or theories based on three principles: verification, falsification, and paradigm revolution to establish a framework of thought that enables intersubjective and objective assessment in the context of its utility. Therefore, the I defines demarcative philosophy as a praxis of understanding, explaining, and giving meaning to everyday issues within the community while considering its critical, evaluative, and beneficial aspects. This concept will help philosophical thinkers find a preference for philosophical approaches based on situational and utilitarian orientations.

An essential component of this demarcation philosophical concept is that philosophical thinkers are willing not only for their propositions or theories to be meaningful at times but also for their propositions or theories to be meaningless at times. Thus, they are subject to revolution according to changing situations. In other words, the demarcation philosophical approach is dialectical, critical, constant, and comprehensive. If depicted, the flow of demarcation philosophical approach will resemble the following diagram below:



This image is intended to convey that a demarcation philosophical approach seeks to relate the contributions of the three principles that color the discourse of demarcation, namely verification, falsification, and paradigm revolution, in philosophical praxis so that its utility can be achieved. Thus, the praxis of philosophy possesses an elasticity and reach that extends into the real-life contexts faced by communities.

Of course, this demarcative philosophical approach has several components that are important for philosophers to consider. In this regard, the most fundamental aspect is for philosophers to weigh and view meaning by connecting it with situations and contexts in everyday life, whether personal, social, or cultural. To achieve this goal, the fundamental component is derived by philosophers creating networks that bind meaning to the situations or contexts grappled with through patterns of critical, dialectical, constant, and comprehensive thinking and using both analytical and synthetic assessment.

In these components, demarcative philosophical praxis can be seen as an approach that promotes and emphasizes the importance of the situations or contexts of human community issues. The principles used are, of course, aligned with what is aimed at in terms of its utility and the types of daily situations or contexts that are intended to be interpreted so that demarcative philosophical praxis provides room not only for natural statements but also for metaphysical and predictive discourses based on local wisdom, as long as all of these can pass the principle of meaningfulness.

Nonetheless, after observing the strengths of this proposed approach, the I also recognizes its weaknesses, so this approach is dynamic but dialectical and can be improved and perfected. The apparent weakness is—as the I has recognized in previous sections—the possibility that it may hinder the constant and dialectical nature of philosophical praxis due to the limitation of philosophical discourse and the placement of its utility within specific situations or contexts, which could lead to the dominance of pragmatic patterns over the emergence of paradigmatic patterns in philosophical praxis. In this context, demarcation can actually make philosophical values counter-revolutionary and then fail to produce diverse philosophical thoughts that are constant, dialectical, and imaginative.

After highlighting the weaknesses of the demarcative philosophical approach, I identify four key benefits of this framework in philosophical praxis. Demarcation is essential because it can help (1) distinguish between genuine philosophical studies and pseudo-philosophical ones based on established principles within the demarcation discourse, (2) initiate a critical evaluation process of philosophical inquiries by incorporating considerations of their practical utility, (3) enhance efforts to standardize the scientific nature of research, and (4) delineate studies according to specific branches of philosophy, thereby preventing misuse that could have detrimental effects on society.

To explore the concept of utility more deeply, it is important to recognize that utility is not merely about practical application; it encompasses a broader understanding of how philosophical inquiry contributes to human knowledge and societal well-being. This deeper exploration reveals the novelty of each of the four benefits:

1. Distinguishing Genuine from Pseudo-Philosophical Studies. The utility of this benefit lies in fostering a clearer understanding of what constitutes meaningful philosophical inquiry. By establishing criteria for demarcation, we can better appreciate the integrity and rigor of genuine philosophical work. This not only strengthens the discipline but also enhances public trust in philosophy as a source of knowledge, thereby promoting a more informed engagement with philosophical ideas.
2. Initiating a Critical Evaluation Process. Incorporating practical utility into the evaluation of philosophical inquiries introduces a transformative approach to how philosophy is practiced. This benefit emphasizes the need for philosophical work to be relevant and applicable to real-world issues. By critically assessing the

utility of philosophical theories, we encourage philosophers to engage more directly with societal challenges, thus ensuring that their work is not only theoretically sound but also impactful.

3. Standardizing the Scientific Nature of Philosophical Research. The novelty here lies in the potential for demarcation to contribute to a more cohesive and rigorous scientific discourse. By enhancing efforts to standardize research practices within philosophy, we can create a more systematic approach to philosophical inquiry. This standardization not only improves the clarity and reliability of philosophical findings but also facilitates interdisciplinary collaboration, allowing philosophy to contribute meaningfully to scientific and empirical research.
4. Delineating Studies According to Branches of Philosophy. This benefit highlights the importance of context in philosophical inquiry. By clearly defining the boundaries of different branches, we can prevent the misuse of philosophical concepts in ways that could mislead or harm society. The novelty of this delineation lies in its potential to promote responsible philosophical practice, ensuring that philosophers are aware of the ethical implications of their work and the societal contexts in which they operate.

These four reflections indicate the need for criteria on the boundaries of meaningfulness of a study so that Science is not misused and manipulated to tend then to justify everything. By engaging with the deeper implications of utility, we cultivate a more robust and responsible approach to philosophy that emphasizes its relevance and impact on both individual and collective levels. This approach not only strengthens the discipline but also affirms the vital role of philosophy in addressing contemporary societal issues.

Conclusion

Demarcative philosophy seeks to highlight the significance of the concept of demarcation within the practice of both philosophy and science. This approach is employed to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific propositions, as well as between philosophical and non-philosophical studies. It arose from the analyses of three key thinkers in the field of demarcation. Initially introduced by the Vienna Circle with the principle of verification, it was later critiqued and expanded upon by Karl Popper with his principle of falsification. Additionally, Thomas Kuhn contributed to the discussion with his concept of "scientific revolutions," which emphasizes the transformative shifts that occur within scientific paradigms.

While the demarcation approach provides a crucial evaluative framework for assessing the usefulness of theories, I also recognize that it can potentially impede the inherently dynamic and dialectical nature of philosophy. Although demarcation plays a role in preventing the misuse of science and manipulation, it is essential to balance this with an awareness of the openness of discourse in philosophical praxis. It is important to note that Kuhn's view on paradigms suggests that revolutionary changes can emerge from rigid structures, which may contradict the claim that demarcation stifles revolutionary thought. Furthermore, Popper has explicitly defended falsifiability as a means of enabling dialectical progress rather than hindering it, underscoring the complexity of the relationship between demarcation and philosophical evolution. Ultimately, a nuanced understanding of demarcation can enhance philosophical discourse by fostering both critical evaluation and the openness necessary for revolutionary though.

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